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CHALLENGES TO SPECIAL AUTONOMY IN THE 
PROVINCE OF PAPUA, REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA
DR LAURENCE 
SULLIVAN
This paper concerns the problems, 
particularly from the legal perspective, 
surrounding the implementation of Law No. 
21/2001 on Special Autonomy for Papua 
Province -commonly referred to as Otsus, from 
its Bahasa Indonesia name of Otonomi Khusus. 
For one year I was based at the main state 
university in Papua, Cenderawasih University 
in Jayapura the Provincial Capital, assisting a 
group of academics involved in the drafting of 
regulations to implement Otsus. My background 
is that I was seconded from the Legal Office 
of the devolved Scottish Government to the 
British Council, the idea being that autonomy 
in Papua is the same as devolution in Scotland – 
but with much better weather.
My central point in this paper will be 
that Otsus in Papua is in a lot of trouble. 
In July 2003, more than 18 months after it 
became a valid law, an evaluation meeting in 
Jayapura involving the Provincial Government, 
a Minister from the Central Government 
(Manuel Kaisiepo, an indigenous Papuan) 
and other provincial stakeholders concluded 
that Otsus has been only 10% implemented. 
Responsibility for Otsus’ problems lies 
overwhelmingly with the central government 
in Jakarta. I will particularly focus on the 
Presidential Instruction (or INPRES) issued in 
January 2003 which divides Papua into three 
new Provinces. This division of Papua is known 
in Bahasa Indonesia as pemekaran. 
THE EVOLUTION OF PEMEKARAN
To understand the current situation, it is 
important to understand the evolution of the 
pemekaran and of Otsus.
On 26 February 1999, President Habibie 
received a delegation of prominent Papuans 
known as the “Team 100”, in the State 
Palace in Jakarta. During this meeting, and 
to the astonishment of Habibie, the Team 
100 submitted their desire for merdeka or 
independence from Indonesia. In response 
to this meeting, the Government designed 
alternative strategies to prevent independence. 
One of these strategies was the policy of 
Pemekaran. Although the efficiency of 
governmental administration and the 
acceleration of development are claimed as 
the justificatory reasons for pemekaran, the 
primary motivation is the prevention of national 
disintegration. 
The pemekaran was realised on 4 October 
1999, with the enactment of Law No. 45/99 
concerning the Formation of the Provinces of 
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Central Irian Jaya and Western Irian Jaya and 
also the establishment of three new Regencies 
and one new City (these are the sub-provincial 
levels of local government). There followed the 
appointment of Herman Monim (previously a 
civil servant) to the Governorship of Central 
Irian Jaya and Brigadier-General (Retired) 
Abraham Atururi to the Governorship of 
Western Irian Jaya.
The pemekaran policy concerning the 
formation of the Provinces of Central Irian Jaya 
and Western Irian Jaya was rejected by different 
community groups in Papua, as evidenced by 
large demonstrations, including a sit-in, at 
the provincial assembly (DPRD) building and 
the Governor’s Office in Jayapura on 14-15 
October 1999. The DPRD (provincial assembly) 
responded to, and legitimised, this community 
opposition by formally rejecting the pemekaran. 
There were several reasons for this rejection:
• the pemekaran had been conducted 
without any community consultation
• the pemekaran was not in accordance 
with the recommendations of the 
Government of Irian Jaya, which had 
stated that any pemekaran should be into 
two, not three, provinces
• the pemekaran was more intended 
as a strategy for strengthening the 
territorial integrity of Indonesia, rather 
than developing Papua. This point is 
evidenced from the format of the 
pemekaran, which pays little attention to 
social-cultural unity, readiness of human 
resources or economic capability.
The Central Government and the 
Indonesian Parliament (DPR RI) responded 
to the demands of the Papua community by 
postponing the formation of the new Provinces 
of Central Irian Jaya and Western Irian Jaya. 
Meanwhile, several other articles in Law 45/99 
that regulated the formation of the three new 
Kabupaten (Regencies) and the new City were 
implemented effectively.
THE EVOLUTION OF OTSUS
On 19 October 1999, in a General Meeting 
of the 12th Session of the MPR (Upper 
House of the Indonesian Parliament), MPR 
Resolution No. IV/MPR/1999 concerning the 
Basic Guidelines of State Policy (‘GBHN’) 
for 1999-2004 was stipulated. Chapter IV, 
Letter G, Item 2 contained the policy of 
Special Autonomy for Aceh and Irian Jaya. 
The complete policy formula is: “…within the 
framework of developing regional autonomy 
in the context of the unitary State of the 
Republic of Indonesia [NKRI], resolving fairly 
and completely the problems in the regions 
requires immediate and serious handling and the 
taking of the following steps: defending national 
integrity and respecting the variety and diversity 
of social and cultural life within the community 
of Irian Jaya, through the stipulation of special 
regional autonomy, which shall be regulated 
with a Law…”.
This MPR Resolution only mentions Irian 
Jaya (not Central Irian Jaya, Western Irian 
Jaya and Eastern Irian Jaya) and, politically, it 
annulled the contents of Law No. 45/99 (the 
law enacting the pemekaran), particularly those 
articles concerning the formation of the two 
new Provinces of Central and Western Irian 
Jaya.
No concrete action was taken to implement 
the MPR Resolution of 1999, however. 
Following an evaluation of Government activity 
in implementing Regional Autonomy across 
Indonesia in general, and Special Autonomy 
for Aceh and Irian Jaya in particular, the next 
Annual Session of the MPR in 2000 passed 
Resolution No. IV/MPR/2000 concerning Policy 
Recommendations in Implementing Regional 
Autonomy. One of the parts of this Resolution 
states that “the statute for Otsus for the 
Extraordinary Regions of Aceh and Irian Jaya, 
according to the mandate of MPR Resolution 
No. IV/MPR/1999 concerning Basic Guidelines 
of State Policy for 1999-2004, shall be issued, 
not later than 1 May 2001, with close attention 
to relevant regional community aspirations…”.
However, Otsus for Irian Jaya Province 
was not enacted within the time limit clearly 
mandated by this MPR Resolution. This delay 
was caused by: 
• political escalation in Irian Jaya 
Province before and after the Second 
Papuan People’s Congress in Jayapura in 
2000 which demanded independence and 
• the genuine desire of the Government 
of President Abdowrahman Wahid to be 
attentive to the aspirations of Papuans.
Discussions concerning Otsus started 
seriously when Jaap Solossa (who had been 
a member of the Team 100) was inaugurated 
as Governor of Papua Province at the end 
of 2000. On Governor Solossa’s initiative an 
Assistance Team was formed which prepared 
two documents: a Background Paper on Special 
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community and were prepared to trust Jakarta’s 
assurances that it sincerely wanted to implement 
a meaningful level of autonomy for Papua.
This draft Bill, prepared in Papua by 
Papuans, became the primary reference 
document during the legislative process. After 5 
months debate, during which many elements of 
the draft Bill were substantially watered down, 
the DPR RI passed Otsus on 22 October 2001.1 
Otsus was then submitted to the President 
for validation and on 21 November 2001, 
the President of the Republic of Indonesia, 
Megawati Soekarnoputri, brought into effect 
Law No. 21 of 2001 concerning Special 
Autonomy for Papua Province. Otsus was to 
become effective as of 1 January 2002.
Autonomy; and a Draft Bill on Special 
Autonomy for Papua Province. 
Neither of these documents makes any 
reference to three Provinces and they are 
entirely predicated on one Province in Papua. 
It is clear that the Otsus process involved the 
development of an entirely new concept which 
was inherently assumed to have superseded the 
prior, rejected three Provinces plan. These two 
documents were discussed at a Study Forum 
in Jayapura in March 2001. One-third of the 
delegates walked out in support of merdeka/
independence. This shows that those elements of 
Papuan society which became involved in Otsus 
were, to an extent, stepping outside their own 
The division of Papua into West Irian Jaya (Irian Jaya Barat), Central Irian Jaya (Irian Jaya Tengah) and rump Irian 
Jaya according to Law 45/1999 and as reaffirmed by Presidential Decree 1/2003 (Inpres 1/2003).
NB. The new province of “West Irian Jaya” is now officially recognised. The division of “Central Irian Jaya” from 
rump “Irian Jaya” has not yet taken place and is not recognised in the electoral boundaries for the 2004 General Election. 
This map does not indicate boundary changes to create 14 new regencies (Kabupaten) as per Law 26/2002 (UU 26/2002). 
Most of these new Regencies do not yet exist (have offices, etc), although they are recognised in the electoral boundaries 
for the April 2004 General Election.
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THE POSITION OF OTSUS NOW
In theory, Otsus has been valid for over 
20 months, but it is not yet effective. This is 
because of three principal factors: the inability 
of Papua to enact secondary regulations under 
Otsus; the non-existence of an institution 
central to Otsus; and problems concerning the 
division of revenue
The institutional structure of Otsus is as 
follows:
• The Executive branch of Provincial 
Government is the Governor, the 
Deputy-Governor and their staff. 
• The Legislative branch of Provincial 
Government consists of two bodies. 
The superordinate body is the existing 
provincial assembly, the DPRD, which 
under Otsus is enlarged and becomes 
the DPRP and is elected by all the 
inhabitants of Papua Province.
• Otsus envisages a new body as a quasi-
upper chamber: the MRP (the Papuan 
Peoples Assembly). The MRP is intended 
to be the cultural representative of 
indigenous Papuans. Its members must 
be indigenous Papuans with one-third 
each of the membership being adat (the 
traditional tribal communities), religious 
and womens representatives. The MRP is 
a unique body within Indonesia’s system 
of governance and its exact role and 
powers are laid out in some detail in 
Articles 19 – 25 of Otsus.
Inability to enact secondary regulations 
under Otsus
Regulations in the form of Provincial 
Regional Regulations (PERDASI) and Special 
Regional Regulations (PERDASUS), which are 
the operational basis of Otsus, do not yet 
exist. The delay in enacting PERDASI and 
PERDASUS is because the institutions with 
the competence to enact these two types of 
regulations do not yet exist. Under Otsus, 
the difference between these two types of 
implementing regulations is one of process 
rather than of substance. Both types of 
regulations are made by the DPRP together with 
the Governor but PERDASUS cover matters 
of particular interest to indigenous Papuans and 
therefore the approval of the MRP is also 
required [Article 20(1)c]. For PERDASI, the 
MRP has no right of veto but it can make 
comments and ask for a review of a particular 
PERDASI before it becomes effective [Article 
21(1)b]. Until now the DPRD Papua Province 
has not been changed into the DPRP, so 
PERDASI cannot be made and because the 
MRP does not yet exist, PERDASUS also 
cannot be made.
Therefore, twenty months down the line 
no implementing regulations under Otsus have 
been made, although the Governor’s Office, 
University academics, community groups, adat 
communities and other stakeholders have 
prepared many draft regulations. No regulations 
have been enacted in the priority areas of 
education and health, nor in relation to adat 
rights, the hak ulayat (traditional land rights) or 
natural resource management. There have been 
no regulations concerning affirmative action, 
though Otsus gives Papua powers which, if 
used imaginatively, could improve the position 
of indigenous Papuans and reduce their socio-
economic marginalisation.
Non-existence of the Majelis Rakyat Papua 
(MRP) or Papuan Peoples’ Assembly
The Central Government has not yet made 
the Regulation establishing the MRP. The non-
existence of the MRP was (until the pemekaran) 
the core problem facing Otsus. 
The procedure stipulated in Otsus for the 
establishment of the MRP has 3 stages:
• The Governor of Papua Province 
and DPRP (regional assembly) submit a 
proposal to the Government detailing the 
requirements, numbers and procedures 
for the election of MRP members, as 
material for the Government to draw up a 
Government Regulation [Article 72(1)]. 
• From receipt of this proposal the 
Government has 1 month to complete 
the Regulation [Art 72(2)]. 
• Finally, the procedure for election 
is stipulated in a regional regulation 
(PERDASI), based on the Government 
Regulation. 
The proposal from the Governor and 
the regional assembly was submitted to the 
Government on 15 July 2002. A group from 
the Province went to Jakarta to submit and 
explain the proposal to the Government. 
The Government, however, has not issued 
the Regulation and has provided no detailed 
explanation as to why it has failed to comply 
with the time limit specified in Otsus. There has 
been no process of dialogue with Papua about 
the content of this Government Regulation; 
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for a long time no one in Papua even knew upon 
whose desk the Province’s proposal was sitting. 
Hari Sabarno, the Minister for Internal Affairs 
in the Central Government (Dalam Negeri) 
said, very explicitly, in Papua in April that the 
regulation would be issued in August.2 August 
has come and gone and the regulation has yet to 
be issued. It is now over one year late.
Recently, there has been activity and the 
Department of Internal Affairs (Dalam Negeri) 
has been preparing a draft. However, the 
Government has said that it intends to diminish 
the role of the MRP from that intended within 
Articles 19 to 25 of Otsus. During a visit 
to Papua in April, Internal Affairs Minister 
Hari Sabarno explicitly stated that the central 
government was not satisfied with the proposal 
from Papua because the MRP would have the 
power to cancel decisions made by the DPRP and 
the Governor. Sabarno said that the MRP should 
not be able to cancel decisions such as these, 
that it should just be the cultural representative 
of Papuans and that it must not become what he 
described as a ‘super-political body’.3
In recent days, with the Government under 
some pressure following events in Timika (where 
at least 5 people have been killed following an 
attempt to physically establish the new Province 
of Central Irian Jaya), Sabarno has repeated 
this line, saying that “The central government 
strongly opposes the idea of enabling the MRP 
to annul the decisions of the Governor or 
DPRP as proposed by the Papuans.”4 However, 
Article 20(1)(c) of Otsus explicitly gives the 
MRP the authority “to give consideration and 
approval to draft PERDASUS”. The MRP 
does therefore have the right to annul certain 
types of regulations and this is not a mere 
proposal “by the Papuans” as Sabarno claims. 
This is contained in the formal, valid law of 
Indonesia which was enacted by the Indonesian 
Parliament and brought into effect by Hari 
Sabarno’s own Government. The Government’s 
contention that the MRP must not be a political 
institution conflicts with its own legislation. At 
times it appears that Jakarta regards Otsus as a 
discussion document, rather than respecting it as 
the law of the land to be followed by all parties, 
including the central government.
The non-existence of the MRP has had 
a debilitating affect on Otsus and has made 
it difficult to build awareness of, and support 
for, Otsus in Papua. In the MRP’s continued 
absence, Jakarta’s claims to be committed to 
Otsus ring hollow. 
Division of Revenue
Within the framework of Otsus, the division 
of revenue, between the Province and the 
Regencies (local government units) is 
considered to have been conducted inequitably 
during its first year. The revenue is distributed 
60% to the Province and 40% to the 
Regencies. This situation has created the 
negative perception that Otsus merely transfers 
the centralist tradition from Jakarta to Jayapura. 
The Regencies wish to reverse this ratio of 
60-40 in their favour and a draft PERDASUS 
containing relevant factors for deciding the 
division of revenue has been prepared for debate 
and enactment but, of course, this regulation 
cannot be enacted because of the non-existence 
of the appropriate institutions.
INPRES NO. 1/2003 
To these problems, which were already 
sufficient, the pemekaran (the division of Papua 
into three provinces) was then added.
The Provincial Government and different 
components of the Papua community were 
dismayed at the issuing of Presidential 
Instruction (INPRES) No. 1/2003 on 27 January 
2003. The INPRES commands the formation of 
the Provinces of Central Irian Jaya and Western 
Irian Jaya according to Law No. 45/99 and the 
activation of their governorships. 
On 3 February 2003, the Minister of Internal 
Affairs (Dalam Negeri) issued Radiogram 
134/221/SJ requesting central and provincial 
government officials to take operational steps 
relevant to the INPRES. The radiogram also 
said that the INPRES, made under Law No. 
45/99, is to operate together with Otsus, which 
is highly problematic because Otsus has a 
procedure for pemekaran of the province which 
is different from Law No. 45/99. 
Conflict Between the INPRES and Otsus
Article 76 of Otsus states that “Pemekaran 
(splitting) of Papua Province to become 
Provinces shall be conducted with the 
agreement of the MRP and the DPRP after 
close attention is given to social-cultural unity, 
readiness of human resources and economic 
capability and development in the future.”
There has clearly not been any compliance 
with this article. The INPRES fails to fulfil any 
of the five conditions. The DPRP has not given 
its agreement and the MRP is unable to do so 
because it does not exist. The reaction to the 
INPRES and, in particular, the recent deaths 
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in Timika show that it has hardly fostered 
social-cultural unity. There can also be little 
doubt that there is neither a readiness of human 
resources nor of economic capability for three 
Provinces at this time. The Government’s claims 
that three Provinces will assist the economic 
development of Papua have been somewhat 
unconvincing. 
INPRES No. 1/2003 conflicts with Otsus. 
The legal question is which law is superior? The 
Government’s pro-pemekaran legal argument 
centres on Law No. 45/99 which was never 
formally repealed or revised. The Governor-
designate of Western Irian Jaya, Abraham 
Atururi, argues that Law 45/99 was not 
cancelled but only postponed and that “in a 
conducive situation it returns to life.”5 Similarly, 
the Minister for Internal Affairs, Hari Sabarno 
has said that: “Law 45/99 was never withdrawn 
or cancelled, only postponed so it is not 
wrong if it is re-validated through the issuing 
of INPRES 1/2003.”6 Pro-pemekaran supporters 
have argued that, while Article 76 of Otsus 
clearly requires approval for any new provinces 
created after Otsus was passed in November 
2001, the Provinces of Central Irian Jaya and 
Western Irian Jaya have existed legally since 
1999 and it does not matter that for 3 years 
and 4 months these ‘Provinces’ had no staff, 
no offices, and no actual physical existence. 
Therefore, it is argued, Article 76 of Otsus 
does not apply to the Provinces of Central and 
Western Irian Jaya. 
Pro-pemekaran groups also contend that if 
Otsus was only intended to apply to one 
Province then Otsus should have specifically 
repealed Law No. 45/99. It is important 
therefore to address this question of why Otsus 
did not specifically repeal Law No. 45/99.
The background is as follows.7 The DPR 
(Indonesian Parliament) commission which 
discussed the draft Otsus Bill accepted that 
Otsus superseded Law No. 45/99. The 
pemekaran mandated by Law No. 45/99 had 
never been implemented and now it could not 
be carried out without the approval of the DPRP 
and MRP. The obvious step was to repeal Law 
No. 45/99, but this Law constituted the only 
legal basis on which the three new Regencies 
and the one new City had been established and 
accepted by the community. Consequently, it 
was agreed that Law No. 45/99 would be revised 
at a later date by deleting the articles connected 
with the pemekaran of the province without 
disturbing the legitimacy of the new Regencies 
and City. 
This is an important issue because it 
shows that the Indonesian Parliament and 
the Government itself, in 2001, considered 
the pemekaran under Law No. 45/99 to be 
politically obsolete and that it undertook to 
make it legally obsolete as well. In his recent 
book evaluating Otsus, Agus Sumule refers to 
the DPR discussions at that time and the 
specific assurances given that this pemekaran 
was dead. 
SUPERIORITY OF OTSUS
However, notwithstanding the fact that Law 
No. 45/99 was not repealed, there are other 
legal arguments, arising from fairly basic legal 
principles, for why any pemekaran of Papua 
Province should be regulated by Article 76 of 
Otsus and not by Law No. 45/99.
Lex Superiori derogat legi inferior
The first legal principle of relevance is lex 
superiori derogat legi inferior which means 
that a superior regulation nullifies an inferior 
regulation. Hierarchically, Otsus is equal with 
Law No. 45/99 in that they are both statutes. 
However, Otsus has a special position because 
it was based on a mandate in MPR Resolutions 
in 1999 and 2000. The basic hierarchy of norms 
in the Indonesian legal system is as follows: 
the 1945 Constitution (and amendments to 
it) is the supreme legal instrument; then 
there are Resolutions of the MPR; and then 
Statutes enacted by the DPR. Therefore, an 
MPR Resolution constitutes the superior legal 
instrument compared to a statute and is only 
out-ranked by the Constitution itself. 
The two MPR RI Resolutions of 1999 and 
2000 commanded the enactment of Special 
Autonomy Laws for the Provinces of Irian Jaya 
and Aceh. This command was for one province, 
not three. Therefore Law No. 45/99, which 
conflicts with and is incompatible with these 
MPR Resolutions, should be nullified. 
Lex Posterior derogat legi Prior
The second legal principle of relevance is 
lex posterior derogat legi prior which means 
that a new law sets aside a conflicting older 
law. This rule is also known as ‘the doctrine of 
implied repeal’. This doctrine assumes that the 
legislative body was fully aware when it enacted 
the later law that it conflicted with the prior law 
and by passing the later law the legislative body’s 
intention was to override the prior law. 
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follows: to the north with the Pacific Ocean, 
to the south with Maluku Province and the 
Arafura Sea, to the west with the Provinces of 
Maluku and North Maluku and to the east with 
the State of Papua New Guinea. Therefore, in 
Otsus the government explicitly acknowledged 
that Papua Province is geographically identical 
to Irian Jaya Province.
Third, the general nature of Law No. 22/99 
(the Indonesia-wide autonomy law) emphasises 
the special nature of Otsus. The inherent lex 
generalis nature of Law No. 22/99 is illustrated 
by the fact that it contains several territorial 
exceptions: 
• for Jakarta, as the capital city
• for Aceh and Yogyakarta to retain their 
special historical privileges
• and for East Timor to be given special 
autonomy (Law No. 22/99 was enacted 
before East Timor’s independence). 
Law No. 22/99 can be viewed as a blanket 
covering all of Indonesia but with 4 holes 
built into it for Jakarta, East Timor, Aceh and 
Yogyakarta. Otsus merely inserts another hole 
into that blanket for Papua. Law No. 22/99 is a 
classic lex generalis with special provisions for 
certain special territories. In these territories it is 
these special provisions which should always be 
given priority.
The legal conclusion ought to be that the 
only procedure that can be used to pemekaran 
Papua Province is that contained within Article 
76 of Otsus. More generally, the provisions 
of Otsus and other statutory regulations in 
Indonesia should be interpreted as narrowly or 
as broadly as is required to give effect to the 
underlying lex specialis nature of Otsus.
Given that the legal position ought to be 
clear, there has been discussion in Papua about 
the possibility of taking a judicial review to the 
Supreme Court or to the recently established 
Constitutional Court. However, there is concern 
that the courts may be subject to non-legal 
influences. Also, law is not the predominant 
issue here. The issuing of the INPRES was a 
political act, conducted under the veneer of 
legalism, and perhaps therefore the situation 
requires a political solution. 
GOVERNMENTAL ISSUES
As well as these legal questions the INPRES 
and the pemekaran also raise governmental and 
economic issues.
This principle is particularly relevant because 
Otsus (Law No. 21/2001) post-dates Law No. 
45/1999 by only two years and the DPR 
which passed both these Laws consisted of the 
same membership. The members of the DPR, 
when enacting Otsus, must have known that it 
conflicted with Law No. 45/99. Therefore, the 
intention of the DPR can be clearly ascertained. 
If these two statutes conflict, then the latter, 
Otsus, is superior and its provisions must be 
followed and those of Law No. 45/99 set aside. 
Consequently, INPRES No. 1/2003 has emerged 
from a statute which should not possess legal 
validity.
Lex Specialis derogat legi generali
Finally, and most importantly, the doctrine 
of lex specialis derogat legi generali is highly 
pertinent. This provides that, in the context 
of a difference in the normative rules between 
regulations of the same rank or degree, norms 
which are special set aside norms which are 
general. A special law defines certain issues 
more specifically and prevails over a general law 
on the matters contained in the special law. 
Otsus is such a special law and derogates 
from the general Indonesia-wide regional 
autonomy law – Law No. 22/99. This is 
evidenced by a number of factors.
First, Otsus was always intended to be a 
lex specialis. The Background Paper submitted 
by the Province says that “the speciality of 
autonomy of Papua means that there are basic 
aspects applied only in Papua and [which] might 
not be applied in other areas of Indonesia, 
just as there are aspects applied in other 
areas in Indonesia which are not applied in 
Papua” [para 1.3]. This intention was reflected 
in Article 74 of Otsus which states that: “All 
existing statutory regulations shall be declared 
as applicable in Papua Province to the extent 
not stipulated in this Law.” The meaning of 
Article 74 ought to be clear: Indonesia-wide 
statutory regulations are only applicable in 
Papua Province if they do not conflict with 
provisions of Otsus. If there is any conflict, then 
the provisions of Otsus should take precedence. 
Second, in addition to Article 74 there 
are other textual references within Otsus – 
particularly in the Preamble and in Article 
1 - which show that Papua Province has a 
special kind of autonomy: a level of autonomy 
different, distinct and unique from the ‘normal’ 
level of autonomy provided for in Law No. 
22/99 (the general autonomy law for Indonesia). 
Furthermore, the general elucidation of Otsus 
states that Papua Province has boundaries as 
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The Radiogram from the Internal Affairs 
Department No. 134/221/SJ states that the 
implementation of INPRES No. 1/2003 must be 
conducted together with the operation of Otsus 
for Papua Province, even though the contents 
of Otsus are different in important ways from 
the contents of Law No. 45/99. Similarly, 
many statements from the Government and 
supporters of the three Provinces within Papua 
have suggested that there is no incompatibility 
between the three Provinces and Otsus.8 It has 
been argued that, firstly, the three Provinces will 
be implemented and then Otsus. 
However, seven months after issuing the 
INPRES, the Government has still not provided 
a detailed explanation of how Otsus would 
operate in the context of the three Provinces. 
All there has been is repeated declarations 
that the pemekaran and Otsus will proceed. 
This is indicative of the incomplete nature 
of democracy in Indonesia. To begin with, 
the central government acted in an arbitrary 
manner by issuing the INPRES and it then 
managed to avoid having to account for its 
actions. This also reflects the lack of domestic 
political pressure within Indonesia concerning 
the Papua question.
More fundamentally, it is not clear if the 
Government intends Otsus to operate across the 
whole area of Papua, as a single unit, or if Otsus 
will be applied separately to all three Provinces. 
For example, under Article 2 of Otsus which 
permits regional symbols, will there be one flag 
and anthem for the whole of Papua or three 
different flags and anthems? Presumably each 
new Province would have its own Provincial 
Assembly (DPRD). Would there then be three 
MRP or a single MRP to cover all three 
Provinces? How would a sole MRP exercise 
its functions across three Provinces? It might 
also be questioned how likely it is that the 
Government will establish three MRPs to 
represent indigenous Papuans when it has thus 
far failed to establish one. 
There is also confusion at the level of 
Provincial names. Article 1(a) of Otsus states 
that “Papua Province is the Province of Irian 
Jaya which is given special autonomy within the 
framework of the unitary State of the Republic 
of Indonesia [NKRI].” However, INPRES No. 
1/2003 designates the new Provinces as Central 
Irian Jaya and Western Irian Jaya – not as 
Central Papua and Western Papua. Therefore, 
will the new Provinces still be called Papua 
or will the previous, highly-disliked, Indonesian 
name of Irian Jaya be revived? 
ECONOMIC ISSUES
Another central question, which the 
Government has yet to address, concerns the 
distribution amongst the three Provinces of the 
additional finance that Papua receives under 
Otsus. This additional finance consists of: 80% 
of general mining revenue in Papua; 70% 
of natural oil and gas mining revenue; and 
2% of Indonesia’s National General Allocation 
Fund. Since Otsus became effective, Papua 
Province has been receiving these additional 
funds, though in both post-Otsus financial years 
(2002 and 2003) the late release of these 
funds by Jakarta has caused problems for the 
financial management of projects. However, 
Papua’s budget has increased substantially and 
without doubt the financial provisions are one 
of the best parts of Otsus. Indeed, it may be the 
case that the Central Government views Otsus 
from a purely financial perspective – i.e. Otsus 
means giving Papua more money – whereas 
Otsus ought to be viewed more holistically 
as having social, economic, political, moral, 
historical and cultural components. 
Therefore, if there are three Provinces how 
will these Otsus funds be distributed, assuming 
that Papua continues to receive them at all? 
Will the natural resources revenue be distributed 
on a geographical basis so that Western Irian 
Jaya will receive revenue from the new BP 
natural gas project at Tangguh and so that 
Central Irian Jaya will receive revenue from the 
Freeport copper-goldmine while the remaining 
eastern Province will receive nothing from these 
projects? How will the special 2% fund be 
distributed amongst the three Provinces? No 
explanation has been forthcoming from the 
Government. 
CONCLUSION ON INPRES AND 
PEMEKARAN
The Government has failed to adequately 
answer the central question that INPRES No. 
1/2003 raises. That is, if Papua Province no 
longer exists in its entirety, how can Otsus be 
implemented? The official Government policy 
is to implement the pemekaran and also 
to implement Otsus. It is the Government’s 
responsibility to explain how the pemekaran 
operates with Otsus. The absence of an 
explanation has caused the pemekaran to be 
dubbed ‘the silent policy’ in Papua. 
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Although the policy of pemekaran of Papua 
Province, from the perspective of administrative 
governance, is viewed as one of the alternatives 
for creating effective and efficient governmental 
administration and advancing development, the 
format of the pemekaran as regulated in Law 
No. 45/99 is imprecise and does not provide 
significant advantages for raising services, 
empowering the community and accelerating 
development in Papua. This three Provinces 
policy has structural flaws and it seems to 
indicate that the Government is not serious 
about development in Papua. The INPRES is 
not about good governance in Papua but about 
perceived security and political threats. 
Given this, the Government’s protestations 
that it remains committed to the 
implementation of Otsus lack credibility. A 
possible scenario is that after the three Provinces 
have been securely established the Government 
may decide that three Provinces are not, after 
all, compatible with Otsus and it may then 
decide to abandon, or radically revise, Otsus. 
The INPRES does not legally invalidate Otsus, 
but it risks rendering it politically impotent. 
This prospect of revising (i.e emasculating) 
Otsus has already been flagged by pro-
pemekaran interests. It has been argued that 
the issuing of Otsus was conducted when 
the political conditions were “warmed with 
the aspiration for Merdeka” (Independence) 
and that the Central Govt made a mistake, 
especially in providing for the MRP. Behind all 
this is Jakarta’s fear that the MRP may contain 
pro-Merdeka sympathisers.9 Essentially, there is 
a view that Jakarta enacted Otsus because it had 
to and that now it can rein Papua back in.
The INPRES is bad for Papua, but it is also 
a retrograde step for Indonesia as a whole. Otsus 
constitutes the realisation of the instruction 
in MPR Resolution No. IV/MPR/1999; so 
it acquires its legal legitimacy and political 
value from the representatives of the entire 
populace of Indonesia. By issuing the INPRES 
the Government has essentially ignored and 
disregarded one of its own laws. This is at a 
time when it is widely accepted that one of 
Indonesia’s seminal problems is the state of the 
country’s legal system and the absence of legal 
certainty. 
Politically, the INPRES undermines those 
Papuans who are willing to work with Jakarta 
and narrows the middle ground in Papuan 
politics. The Papuan Presidium (the peaceful 
body which supports Independence) has made 
the point that this is what happens when 
you engage with the Indonesian Government. 
The Presidium opposes three Provinces, 
although it is hardly a supporter of Otsus either, 
and it has called for a three-option referendum: 
3 Provinces; Otsus; or Merdeka. There is, of 
course, no likelihood of such a referendum 
occurring. 
There is however a solution to the current 
situation. The Government should cancel this 
pemekaran and establish the MRP which could 
then consult widely within Papua concerning 
the whole pemekaran issue. After all, Otsus 
permits pemekaran and provides a procedure for 
it in Article 76 – albeit a procedure which 
is internal to Papua, rather than the current, 
external, Jakarta-inspired pemekaran. 
At this year’s session, the MPR 
recommended that Law No. 45/99 and INPRES 
No. 1/2003 be revised in order to bring them 
into line with the spirit of Otsus. However, 
Internal Affairs Minister Sabarno has said, 
in the aftermath of the Timika trouble, that 
the government has no intention of dropping 
Law No. 45/99 and instead it has suggested 
adjustments to Otsus, particularly concerning 
the MRP.10 This is not surprising – given the 
investment that certain elements have made 
in this pemekaran policy they are unlikely to 
abandon it lightly. 
STATUTORY REGULATIONS
I will now mention some of the other 
problems of a legal variety which Otsus faces.
The basic structure of Otsus is that Papua 
Province is given a general legislative and 
executive competence from which several 
areas are then excluded for retention by the 
central Government of Indonesia. Otsus does 
not specifically list the powers which can 
be exercised by Papua Province. The basic 
proposition under Otsus is that Papua Province 
has authority over all subjects which do not 
relate to subjects specifically retained by the 
central government.
Article 4(1) specifies the regional 
competence of Papua Province as follows: “The 
competence of Papua Province covers all sectors 
of administration, except for competence in the 
sectors of foreign politics, security and defence, 
monetary and fiscal, religion and judicature and 
certain authorities in other sectors stipulated 
according to statutory regulations.”
The elucidation to Otsus then states 
that “certain authorities in other sectors” 
covers: National planning policy; Macro 
national development; Financial balance fund; 
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State administration system; State economic 
institutions; Development and empowerment of 
human resources; Utilisation of natural resources 
and strategic high technology; and National 
conservation and standardisation.
Some of these additional Central 
Government powers are vague and concepts 
such as “empowerment of human resources” 
or “national conservation and standardisation” 
could be used by the Central Government to 
enact regulations in areas which were intended 
to be within the competence of Papua Province. 
In all other areas of governance not 
mentioned in Article 4 Papua Province can 
make its own regulations: PERDASUS and 
PERDASI. However, in many areas Otsus states 
that PERDASUS, PERDASI and other actions 
of the Province must be in accordance with 
statutory regulations. This occurs 39 times 
throughout Otsus. The Department of Internal 
Affairs (Dalam Negeri) has prepared a list of 
39 regulations which it claims it must enact 
before Papua Province can enact PERDASUS 
and PERDASI. Papua’s regulations must then be 
in accordance with these Central Government 
regulations. 
There may be circumstances in which 
provisions of Otsus, or PERDASUS or 
PERDASI made under Otsus, conflict with these 
other statutory regulations and the question 
of whether or not Otsus is superior to other 
statutory regulations will again arise. 
Regional Symbols
For example, Article 2(2) of Otsus says that 
Papua Province may have its own regional flag 
and regional anthem so long as they are not used 
as symbols of sovereignty. Article 2(3) says that 
these regional symbols shall be further stipulated 
by a PERDASUS based on the provisions of 
statutory regulations.
Article 2(3) is included in the list of 
39 statutory regulations which Internal Affairs 
(Dalam Negeri) intends to make concerning 
Otsus. At present, other regulations exist 
making it a treasonable offence to fly the 
Papuan ‘Morning Star’ Flag (as well as other 
flags in relation to Aceh and Maluku). The 
Government’s argument is that the design of the 
Papuan flag, allowed by Otsus, has yet to be 
negotiated with the Government and that until 
that time the Morning Star flag will remain 
banned. 
It seems possible that the flag and anthem 
that Papua would wish to adopt under Article 
2(2) would not be permitted according to 
statutory regulations made under Article 2(3). 
It defeats the point of allowing regional symbols 
if the Central Government chooses the symbol 
or has a right to veto the region’s choice of 
symbol. For Article 2 of Otsus to be meaningful 
the actual choice of regional flag must be for 
Papua alone. It may be the case that Papua 
will be allowed any regional flag except for the 
regional flag that it would want. 
Political Parties
Another example of statutory regulations 
that may cut across powers under Otsus concerns 
local political parties. Article 28(1) states 
that: “The inhabitants of Papua Province can 
form political parties.” However, Article 28(2) 
then says that “The procedure for forming 
political parties and participation in the General 
Election shall be in accordance with statutory 
regulations.”
Dispute has arisen over whether this Article 
permits the formation of local political parties 
in Papua Province, distinct from the national 
political parties. Law No. 31/2002 about the 
General Elections in 2004 stipulates that a 
political party will only be shortlisted by the 
General Elections Commission, and thus be 
able to contest next year’s elections, if it has 
branches in at least two-thirds of Indonesia’s 
Provinces.
Clearly, this criterion prevents any local 
political party from contesting the General 
Election. Given the conflict between Article 28 
of Otsus and Law No. 31/2002 on the General 
Elections there is widespread concern in Papua 
that Article 28 is another ‘Pasal Kosong’ or 
‘empty article’. 
Education Law
Jakarta’s attitude towards Otsus has emerged 
in the context of the recently enacted 
statute concerning the National Education 
System. This Law sparked heated debate across 
Indonesia, largely because of its provisions on 
religious instruction in schools. 
Article 56 of Otsus states that education is 
an autonomous competence for Papua Province, 
except that the Central Government shall 
stipulate the general policy for University-level 
education and the core curriculum at all levels 
of education. Consequently, the Indonesian 
Parliament and the Central Government can 
only stipulate some broad principles and 
should not enact detailed regulations concerning 
education in Papua Province. 
Therefore, this Education statute should, 
almost entirely, be inapplicable in Papua because 
education is an autonomous competence 
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according to Otsus. As a matter of constitutional 
principle and state law the Indonesian 
Parliament should not legislate for Papua 
Province in autonomous areas of competence. 
Such an outcome easily could have been 
achieved by the inclusion of a territorial extent 
clause which would simply state: “This Law is 
not valid in Papua Province.” Territorial extent 
clauses should be included in every new statute 
enacted by the Indonesian Parliament in the 
post-Otsus era. For all legislation the Indonesian 
Parliament should consider whether that subject 
is a competence retained by the Central 
Government or a competence for which Papua 
now has autonomy. 
The problem lies with Government 
Departments when drafting legislation and then 
with the Indonesian Parliament which debates 
draft Laws. During the extensive debate on the 
Education Law it would appear that no one in 
the Central Government or in the Parliament 
thought to question whether this Law should 
even be applicable in Papua. It is this attitude, 
and also the basic lack of knowledge about Otsus 
in Jakarta, which is causing many problems.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
Otsus constituted, firstly, the acceptance by 
Indonesia that it has failed Papua for the last 40 
years and, secondly, the heralding of a fresh start 
in the relationship. The Preamble concedes that 
appropriate levels of development, prosperity, 
rule of law and respect for Human Rights 
have not been achieved in Papua and promises 
that the “implementation of the special policy 
concerned is based on….the supremacy of 
law, democracy, ethics and morals”. The 
political message underlying Otsus, from the 
Government’s perspective, is that there were 
many mistakes made during the New Order Era 
but that we, a Reform Government, cannot be 
held responsible for the activities of previous 
Governments and we can only ensure that 
Papua’s future, as part of Indonesia, will be 
better than its past. 
In this context, Jakarta’s approach to Otsus 
has been unfortunate. The issuing of the 
INPRES, in particular, was a gross breach of 
trust by the Government of Indonesia. 
Operating an autonomous system of 
governance is not easy – as many long-standing 
federal and pseudo-federal states can testify. It 
requires a degree of political and governmental 
sophistication which Indonesia, perhaps, does 
not yet possess. However the advantages of 
autonomy for Indonesia and Papua remain 
valid. That is, it maintains Indonesia’s territorial 
integrity while improving Papua’s governance 
and economy and providing a space for Papuans 
to express their distinctive culture and identity. 
This was the Government’s autonomy strategy 
for Papua. The most charitable thing that can be 
said about the Indonesian Government is that 
perhaps it lacks the confidence to pursue an 
autonomy strategy. 
What is required is a change in ethos on 
the Government’s part so that it understands 
and acknowledges that Papua, politically and 
legally, cannot be treated as before and that 
all actions and policies undertaken by the 
Government concerning Papua should abide by 
the provisions, and spirit, of Otsus. 
The position of the international community 
is also important. Many States welcomed and 
encouraged Otsus as a means of satisfying 
Papua’s legitimate grievances while also 
maintaining the territorial integrity of 
Indonesia. If the ‘middle way’ of Otsus fails then, 
eventually, the international community may be 
confronted with the choice of either acquiescing 
to highly unsatisfactory, if not repressive, 
Indonesian rule in Papua or supporting a 
genuine act of self-determination for the 
territory. The international community would 
rather not have to make such a choice and 
if Otsus was fully implemented, respected and 
developed to its maximum potential it would 
probably not have to do so. Consequently, the 
international community may have a role, at 
this stage, in seeking to persuade Indonesia to 
revert to an autonomy strategy and properly 
implement Otsus.
By reverting to policies of divide and rule 
and security strategies, rather than continuing 
with the autonomy strategy laid out in Otsus, 
Jakarta is missing a golden opportunity to 
resolve Papua’s problems and establish trust 
between Papua and Jakarta. Indonesia can no 
doubt sustain this policy in the short and 
medium term. In the long term Indonesia may 
regret undermining Otsus. Indonesia’s policy 
in Papua is driven by its all-pervading fear 
of disintegration. Ironically, the greatest threat 
to Indonesia’s territorial integrity comes not 
from the Papuans, and certainly not from 
the international community, but from the ill-
judged actions of the Central Government. 
Those elements in Jakarta who are disrespecting 
Special Autonomy, in the name of defending 
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